The New Englanders
Phip’s had 2,300 militiamen in seven battalions. A simple division gives an average of roughly 330 men per battalion. This figure is roughly half the size of an actual regular army battalion’s strength during the period. It may be safe to assume that colonial militia units were severely under strength for a variety of reasons. As this was not a Royal or State initiated campaign then perhaps enforcement of service terms may have been rather less stringent than a national war situation. If the militia followed the traditional infantry structure then these 330 man units would be subdivided into 13 companies. Company strength would then be a meagre 25 men.
Phip’s had 2,300 militiamen in seven battalions. A simple division gives an average of roughly 330 men per battalion. This figure is roughly half the size of an actual regular army battalion’s strength during the period. It may be safe to assume that colonial militia units were severely under strength for a variety of reasons. As this was not a Royal or State initiated campaign then perhaps enforcement of service terms may have been rather less stringent than a national war situation. If the militia followed the traditional infantry structure then these 330 man units would be subdivided into 13 companies. Company strength would then be a meagre 25 men.
It has been stated
that the New England militia were organised on
the Trained Band system. This would mean a ratio of two muskets to one pike.
Units could then be composed of two wings of muskets and a central group of
pikemen.
Massachusetts men. The French may have looked different. |
The French
Chartrand mentions
Frontenac reinforcing the St
Charles River
defences with three battalions of regulars. If one assumes that he was prepared
to commit all of his regulars to this forward defence then each battalion could
be roughly 300 men strong. This is however a big assumption. An experienced
soldier like Frontenac would be unlikely to leave the important job of
garrisoning the city to militia and it would be a logical conclusion that he
would have distributed regulars to other key points of his defence. A figure of
300 French per battalion is in my opinion too generous. If Frontenac held back
one third of his regulars in reserve or distributed across other locations then
his three battalions at the St Charles may have been 150 -200 men in strength. The use of the word
‘battalion’ is misleading and may refer to a tactical formation as opposed to
indicating strength. There are no mentions of the French deploying pikes in Canada . This
means that all of their regulars and militia would be armed with muskets.
Whether all of their Indian allies had muskets is a moot point. All of the
above information forces some decisions in terms of organisation for the
scenarios.